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Former Members’ Perspectives are Key to Impacting the FARC
Abstract
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo (FARC–EP or FARC) is one of the
world’s longest surviving insurgency groups. They have worked endlessly to topple the
Colombian Government since 1964. [1] The group began like many anti-government
socialist groups did at the time, in the shadow of Fidel Castro’s Cuba. The FARC’s story
however, is different from most insurgent groups due to their longevity and ability to
survive. Their flexibility has allowed them to remain active and adapt to environmental
changes. Since Colombia remains a major world producer of cocaine, with the FARC being
the leading producer, this group’s eradication is a major responsibility of the world
community.
Interviews conducted in Bogota July 7-17, 2012 revealed evidence that the FARC operates
much like a secular cult. The structure of its internal operations, and how members relate
to each other and to leadership are similar to traits in religious cults. Examining these
traits may shed light on how to better strategize military and civil forces fighting not only
the physical attributes, but also the psychological ones to resist the FARC and similar
groups.
[1] This date is debated among scholars as the FARC claims inception in 1964, the date of
Operation MARQUETALIA, although they did not organize themselves as the FARC until
1966 during the Second Guerilla Conference.
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Introduction
Colombia is a country that has been marred by violence for the better part of the last sixty years. There are
many reasons the violence has permeated, but at the root, government corruption and oppression of the
populace in the early part of the twentieth century was the cause. Patrician landowners did not allow the
lower classes to rise in what can arguably be called an enslavement of the lower class. Distrust, and in
some cases, hatred of the Colombian Government was fueled by failed national policies and brutal
military atrocities like the 1928 Colombian Army massacre of striking banana workers. 1 Furthermore,
lower class disenchantment was intensified by an increasingly disproportionate allocation of the country’s
natural resource ownership by the ruling elite. Even after the first modern agrarian and labor reform in
1936, disparity was still rampant throughout the country. 2 Available statistics from 1960 indicate that the
ruling elites, only 1.7 percent of the population, owned 55 percent of the arable land. In contrast, 62.5
percent of the country’s peasant farmers subsisted on less than one percent of the national territory
suitable for agriculture. 3 The peak of this disparity came in the period from 1946-1953 simply known as la
violencia (the violence).
La violencia began with heavy-handed tactics by the newly elected conservative government in 1946
against liberals. 4 Quickly, the violence developed into mounting casualties at the hands of government
forces. Reported statistics from the la violencia period show that the brutality grew from 22,210 deaths in
1948, when the government began keeping track, to a height of 25,125 in 1951. 5 Therefore, according to
available data, approximately 41percent of all deaths in the nation in 1951 were due to la violencia. 6 The
attention from la violencia spurred famous Argentine physician and revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara
to visit the nation in 1952. He later wrote in a letter to his mother “there is more repression of individual
freedom [in Colombia] than in any other country we’ve been to.” 7
Responding to the violence waged by the government, the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) began a
“contradictory balancing act with regard to its relations to the armed peasants and to the Soviet Union.” 8
For instance, the PCC openly denounced violence while “covertly supporting the self-defense groups in the
countryside.” 9 Unfortunately, May 27, 1964 was the day that changed Colombia forever. On this day, the
U.S.-backed counter-communist operation in the Colombian town of Marquetalia known simply as
Operation MARQUETALIA was launched. 10 The purpose of Operation MARQUETALIA was to support
the U.S. Latin American Security Operation (known as Plan LASO) and undertake “paramilitary, sabotage
and or terrorist activities against known communist proponents.” 11 The plan was to encircle the town
utilizing 16,000 Colombian troops supported by U.S. supplied B-26 bombers targeting forty-eight armed
peasants. 12 Unfortunately, the plan was a complete failure and all 48 peasants escaped. These men two
years later established themselves during the Second Guerilla Conference officially as the FARC. 13
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The Rise of the FARC
Although the FARC somberly recalls Operation MARQUETALIA, their actions in the years since have
shunned the population they are attempting to sway. FARC activity since their inception includes but is
not limited to kidnapping, hostage-taking, narco-trafficking, assassinations, car-bombings, and the
development of a military able to strike the Colombian security forces. Showing little regard for civilian
casualties, FARC targets include areas frequented by civilians such as shopping centers and malls. 14 Their
strength grew and by 1997 the FARC defeated the Colombian Army in several battalion-sized battles,
marking the first time “a modern Latin American army was successfully beaten by such irregular
formations in the field.” 15 In fact, the group grew so powerful that by 1998 the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) assessed “if nothing changed, FARC could take over the country in five years.” 16
However for Colombia the DIA assessment did not materialize in part due to the installation of a new
government under President Alvaro Uribe in 2002. Uribe’s administration changed tactics allowing
amnesty for those who wanted to leave, and created police forces in all 1,099 municipalities. 17 These
actions not only stopped the growth of the FARC, they also began to reverse the FARC’s strength. By 2009
Uribe’s successes were clear, homicides were down 40 percent, kidnappings 83 percent, and terrorist
attacks 76 percent. 18 However, while Colombia is no longer under threat of becoming a failed state, the
FARC is far from benign. In fact, more soldiers and police were killed in 2009 and 2010 than during the
height of the strife in 2002. 19 Bearing this in mind, the importance of the problem cannot be understated
since the FARC is targeting law enforcement elements in the nation. This is especially true since the
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) assesses that the group maintains approximately 8,000
fighters, and the FARC still recruits. 20
Some in the Colombian
population see the FARC as
strength against oppression. This
photo shows the entrance to the
Colombian National Pedagogical
University in Bogota with FARC
graffiti. Note the Colombian flag
symbolically incarcerated inside
the U.S. flag.
(Photo taken by the Author, July
12th, 2012 )
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The Cult of the FARC
While the FARC is a major problem for all levels of Colombian society, their contribution as a major world
player in the production and distribution of cocaine highlights their status as a worldwide affliction.
However, the principle problem in how to eradicate or negotiate with the group appears to be a lack of
understanding about what the FARC is and how it operates. Interviews of former FARC members in
Bogota between July 7 and 17, 2012 revealed evidence that the FARC operates as a secular cult with many
of the same traits as religious cults. In current academic circles this concept is completely absent.
Understanding the complete dynamics of the group and how it operates can shed light on not only on to
fight the group, but also how to rehabilitate those who have been involved. This is especially important
since the group has been romanticized in popular culture (see photo) as a perceived strength against all
oppression.
Data was obtained from interviewed former members of the FARC, demilitarized between 8 and 10 years
ago. Some of those interviewed currently help the state work with newly demilitarized FARC members;
others work for charities helping demilitarized members. Due to their work with newly separated FARC
members, all those interviewed maintain familiarity with the group’s current operations. None of those
interviewed knew each other, as all worked for the FARC in separate regions of the country. There was no
noticed pattern of ethnic background as some were from purely European ethnicity, while others were of
indigenous ethnicity or of Afro-Caribbean origins. The common trait, however, was their birth into
poverty in regions of the country that rarely see state presence (police, army, courts, state sponsored
clinics, etc.). Those former FARC members, now aiding the Colombian Government, were freed under the
policies of former President Uribe’s campaign to demilitarize terror group members early in his
presidency.

Bias
Published in the Journal of Strategic Security for the first time are interviews with former FARC
members. The interviews of the FARC members were sponsored by the Colombian Government as part of
the date collection for a Henley-Putnam University Doctorate of Strategic Security dissertation. The
interviews were author-led, conducted utilizing Grounded Theory allowing the participants to guide the
discussion, which resulted in the materialization that the FARC had cult-like traits in their day-to-day
operations. Since the Colombian Government arranged the interviews, there was a concern these
testimonies may have contained some level of bias. However, there were no Colombian ‘minders’ present
for the interviews and the testimonies were at times quite disparaging of the Colombian Army or Police
operations. Some of those interviewed no longer have government contact and work for a halfway house
charity aiding those leaving the movement. Therefore, the government likely held no influence on them or
their testimony. Their negative comments on illicit government activity would not prove favorable to the
Colombian Government if published; furthering the assessment there was little bias from the Colombian
Government in the interviews. As to the men themselves, their motivation for allowing the interviews
came from wanting to let the world know what was happening and what the true FARC is. They saw
themselves as victims and wanted to have their stories heard.

Cultic Traits
It is imperative to use universally accepted terminology when examining a group and assigning a trait to
them. However, according to Dr. Michael D. Langone, Executive Director of the International Cultic
Studies Association “there is no academically accepted definition of a cult.” 21 Therefore for practical
purposes, the term ‘cult’ used here derives its definition from Dr. Walter Martin, a religious scholar and
one of the world’s most respected scholars on religious cults, as well as secular cultic scholar, Dr. Margret
Thaler Singer, a clinical psychologist specializing in cults and former Adjunct Professor of Psychology at
the University of California at Berkeley.

21 Langone, Michael, Telephone Interview, January 3, 2013.
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Dr. Martin’s research indicates that cults are characterized by a “closed mindedness” and a group that is
“not interested in a rational cognitive evaluation of the facts.” 22 The group has a “genuine antagonism on
the personal level since the cultist almost always identifies his dislike of the Christian message” because
“the clergy of Christendom are obviously the villains…and their theology is to be regarded as
untrustworthy.” 23 Furthermore, “almost all systems of authority in cult organizations indoctrinate their
disciples to believe anyone who opposes their beliefs cannot be motivated by anything other than satanic
force or blind prejudice or ignorance.” 24 Further still, Dr. Martin notes “cults consider that they have
freed their adherents from religious exploitation.” 25 In his experience, Dr. Martin notes that cults
“manifest a type of institutional dogmatism and pronounced intolerance for any position but their own”
and they maintain a “factor of isolation.” 26
Although Dr. Martin’s research focuses on the traits of a religious cult, his definition has application to
non-religious, secular cults like the FARC. Taking religion out of the equation, Dr. Martin’s definition
applied to the FARC could be characterized as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

An educated group, characterized by close-mindedness to outside ideas
Not interested in rational evolution of facts; their truth is absolute truth
Anyone who disagrees with their message has blind prejudice or is ignorant
A group that maintains a factor of isolation towards non-members
A group that freed the member from exploitation

In fact, with the exception of the dislike of the Christian message, Dr. Martin’s findings are echoed by
secular cultic scholar and psychologist, Dr. Margret Thaler Singer. Dr. Singer noted all cults shared many
similarities. For example, cult leaders were determined, domineering and charismatic. 27 They maintain a
double set of morals, as they are to show complete honesty to leadership at the same time as deceiving
non-believers. 28 Cults appear innovative and exclusive; they claim to change the playing field, offering the
only solution to life’s problems. 29 Dr. Singer continues by noting that “cults tend to be totalistic, or all
encompassing, in controlling their members’ behavior and also idealistically totalistic, exhibiting zealotry
and extremism in their worldview.” 30 Furthermore, cults require members to undergo a complete
metamorphosis from their previous life to become a part of the group, in what some may call a loss of
individuality. 31 Amazingly, each of these points fits perfectly with current FARC internal workings. Using
responses from the interviews, they can clearly be seen.
To begin, the FARC is run by charismatic leadership, which according to those interviewed, lure people
into the group under false pretenses. Promises of pay, wealth, and a better life are never fulfilled, yet lure
new members or parents to allow their children to join. A general lack of supplies also means promises of
three hot meals and new uniforms go unfulfilled.
Although one of the enticements for these people is the promise of a complete education, this is only
slightly fulfilled. FARC members constantly read and educate themselves with socialist concepts required
by the FARC to ensure their members become well-educated persons. However, this education is skewed
because while the FARC teaches traditional academic principles, these principles are also used by the
group to buttress FARC concepts. For example, one of the interviewees - ‘William’ quoted from Sun Tzu’s
The Art of War, Machiavelli’s The Prince, and Clausewitz’s On War. He also quoted the economic theory
Martin, Walter, The Kingdom of the Cults (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany Fellowship Publishers, 1977), 24.
Ibid., 25, 30.
24
Ibid., 24.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., 26.
27
Singer, Margret, Cults in our Midst: The Continuing Fight against their Hidden Menace (San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishing, 2003), 8.
28
Ibid., 9.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 10.
31
Ibid.
22
23
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of John Maynard Keynes. The FARC taught these concepts to him using incomplete data and texts to
understand how the non-socialist world was wrong. Keynes’ theories were used to show capitalism and
how it was flawed, again using FARC rationale.
This education also sheds light on one of the cornerstones of FARC operations; propaganda. FARC
members are required to study socialist and FARC propaganda. It was part of what all the interviewees
called brainwashing or mind-control. This follows the totalistic requirement of the group towards its
members mentioned by Dr. Singer. 32 This is also an example of the “close mindedness” within the group
noted by Dr. Martin’s research. 33
While the interviewed ex-members all spoke about the propaganda and the non-torturous mind-control
the FARC performed, it became evident that this followed Dr. Martin’s second point; cults are groups not
interested in rational evolution of facts. The FARC obligated members to read propaganda for at least two
hours daily. The purpose of this was for the information to become second nature. It was one indirect way
for leadership to control the group. True or not, propaganda became what was spoken, heard and read,
and reinforced the concepts in this isolated society. Any concepts outside of FARC accepted theories were
considered irrational, false and could not be uttered. While it can be argued this occurrence is similar in
some cultures, it is foreign in Colombia’s democracy that relishes increased and varied information. It is
therefore an example of how the FARC culturally changes the person.
The concept that non-FARC theories should not even be spoken follows Dr. Martin’s cult principles, as his
research noted that within cults anyone who disagrees with the message has blind prejudice or is
ignorant. The mind-control/propaganda ensures the member will absorb the FARC principles but also
ensures any disagreement is kept to oneself. Keeping ones’ dissenting ideas closely held actually follows
two cult traits, close-mindedness, as well as, maintaining a factor of isolation.
The loss of individuality is both an element of the isolation FARC members’ experience, as well as, the
close-mindedness the FARC requires. Isolation is requisite for the FARC’s survival. This is done to keep
agents of the government from infiltrating their ranks. This is also performed to insulate the group and
its’ members from the outside world -- a requirement for mind-control and making members accept that
the FARC’s way is the only way.
The close-mindedness of the FARC is further evident in the fact that, as noted by those interviewed, FARC
truth is the only truth. While FARC members are not allowed or even encouraged to explore opposing
views. In the end, there cannot be any strength to opposing arguments. Furthermore, a requirement to
join the FARC is a loss of individuality that also follows the FARC requirement to completely commit to
the group, a concept noted by Dr. Singer’s research. Loss of individuality includes use of an entirely new
name and loss of contact with all family, friends and acquaintances. Essentially, the FARC attempts to
erase all traces of the member’s former life. One former member, known in the group as “Nicholas” stated
that after he entered the group he could no longer use the word “I.” 34 He had to respond to any personal
question with “we.” For instance, he stated, “if a member asked me if I needed more food I would have to
respond ‘yes, we would.’” 35
Both the close mindedness and “mind-control” of members of these groups fall into what Dr. Singer calls
“thought-reform.” 36 Examples of persons who have used thought-reform in the past include Chinese
Communist Party Leader Mao Tse-tung (or Mao Zedong) who developed it as “thought struggle” in 1929
as his model to re-educate Chinese citizens. 37 The FARC’s use of thought reform to mold the new
members into what they want, a willing supplicant, achieves the ultimate goal of control over the person.

32
33
34
35
36
37

Ibid.
Ibid.
Interview with the author, Bogota, Colombia, July 12, 2012.
Ibid.
Singer, Cults in our Midst, 52.
Ibid., 53.
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As Dr. Singer notes, “the usual outcome of thought-reform is that the person or group gains almost
limitless control over the subjects for varying periods of time.” 38
Dr. Martin identified Christianity as a threat to cults. This also appears true when examining the cult of
the FARC, as they target men and women of the cloth. Since at least 2005, one of the FARC’s formal
missions has been to kill clergy. Colombian government intelligence reports from September 2005
indicated the FARC leader Jorge Briceño (real name: Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas — aka Mono Jojoy)
ordered his men to kill priests. The assessment, which came from an allegedly taped speech of Briceño
speaking to his troops, also indicated the FARC’s rationale to kill was because "all of these clerics are
agents of the enemy or propagators of a doctrine that numbs people's minds and makes them enemies of
the guerrillas." 39 This statement was followed by the order to "kill all the clerics, without saying it was us,"
attempting to maintain the campaign’s covertness. 40 This directly follows Dr. Martin’s observation that
through the eyes of a cult, “the clergy of Christendom are obviously the villains and are the object of ‘pure
hatred.’” 41
Although this speech was unsubstantiated when it came to light in September 2005, examining the
available data of murdered priests indicates the credibility of the speech. For instance, numbers from
1998 through 2001 indicate twelve priests and nuns were killed in Colombia. 42 However, between 2000
and 2005, the number rose to thirty priests and two bishops. 43 While continual data of murdered clerics
remains elusive, between Jan 1 and September 13, 2011, six priests were murdered in Colombia
highlighting the continued threat to Colombian clergy. 44 This continuous murder trend in-turn caused the
Catholic Church to pull back from regions where the poor were oppressed by the FARC according to
government sources. 45
The reason the FARC targets religious leaders may be found in the fact that religion in this part of the
world offers hope. Hope is a powerful motivator. As was discovered by social psychologist and
Presidential Medal of Freedom recipient Eric Hoffer “the unemployed are more likely to follow the
peddlers of hope than the handers-out of relief.” 46 Although Hoffer was referring to the rise of the Nazi
regime and how ordinary people can turn a blind eye to morality and decency, his observations are
applicable to the FARC. The hope that religion can extend in FARC-controlled territory is a threat to the
FARC. After all, these clerics “numb people’s minds and make them enemies of the guerrillas.” 47
At this point it is important to make a distinction. While many socialist groups recoil from organized
religion, they do not target the religion as an enemy. This is why although anti-religious, the Soviet Union
did not murder clergy. It is also important to understand the Colombian brand of socialism and how
religion and in particular Roman Catholicism created an atmosphere which allowed the establishment
and growth of the FARC. In the 1960s there was a movement in the Catholic Church of Latin America
inspired by what would eventually be called “Liberation Theology.” This theology began prior to and
Ibid., 52.
United Press International (UPI), “Kill priests, FARC leader says.” September 6, 2005, available at:
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2005/09/06/Kill-priests-FARC-leadersays/UPI-92011126036102/.
40
Ibid.
41
Martin, The Kingdom of the Cults, 30.
42
McDermott, Jeremy, “Priests face death in Colombia.” Catholic Herald .co.uk, May 4, 2001, available
at: http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/4th-may-2001/4/priests-face-death-in-colombia.
43
Catholic News Agency, “Number of Priests killed in Colombia rising.” available at:
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/number_of_priests_killed_in_colombia_rising/.
44
Deacon John, “Colombia: Another Priest Murdered.” available at:
http://deaconjohnspace.wordpress.com/2011/09/13/colombia-another-priest-has-been-murdered/.
45
High ranking Colombian Ministry of Defense source interview, information provided on condition of
anonymity
46
Hoffer, Eric, The True Believer; Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York, NY: Harper
Perennial Books, 1951), 15.
47
United Press International, “Kill priests,” September 6, 2005.
38
39
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directly after the Cuban Revolution. Influenced by Marxist ideology, some thought the Church needed to
do more for the poor. Specifically during this time:
“… the church became more aware of its mission in the service of the poor, the oppressed, and the outcast.
In this preferential option, which must not be understood as exclusive, the true spirit of the gospel shines
forth. Jesus Christ declared the poor blessed (Matt. 5:3; Luke 6:20), and he himself wished to be poor for
us (2 Cor.8:9).” 48
However, Liberation Theology’s similarity to Marxism has led some to state it is “Marxism masked as
Christianity.” The theology’s founder, Peruvian Priest Father Gustavo Gutierrez remains a respected
theologian, and is currently the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Theology at Notre Dame University. 49
As his words highlight above, the motivation and intent of the movement focuses on the poor and
oppressed yet it has taken on another meaning; the liberation of these people from their oppressive
governments.
At the time of the FARC’s emergence, many Roman Catholic priests in Latin America were interested in
Liberation Theology which in turn spurred their interest in the insurgent groups. Some even became
influential members of these groups. One was Father Camilo Torres (Restrepo). Father Torres was a wellknown sociologist, university professor and a proponent of Liberation Theology. 50 He stated, “the duty of
every Catholic is to be a revolutionary” and “the Catholic who is not a revolutionary is living in mortal
sin.” 51 He has been called a “decisive figure in the dynamics of ecclesial movements [and] protest of
Central and South America [during] the mid-twentieth century.” 52 This is why Colombian priests initially
did not believe the Colombian intelligence report highlighting their targeting when it first became public.
At the time, Fr. Fabian Marulanda, the Secretary-General of Colombia's Catholic Bishops Conference, said
the intelligence report "should be analyzed because it's not understood why that group would go after
those who are trying to reach them to discuss peace." 53
The fear the FARC applied to the clergy is in many ways similar to the fear they instill in their own
members. Like many religious cults, the FARC controls their members through fear using it as a mindcontrol method to ensure all members adhere to the FARC message. Since, as Dr. Martin noted of all
cults, “anyone who disagrees with their message has blind prejudice or is ignorant,” the FARC uses fear to
ensure everyone adheres to their message. This can be seen in the interviews. 54 All the interviewed
members indicated they feared both internal and external forces to the group. Internal threats were the
members themselves who routinely betrayed one another. ‘Uberney’ stated fear of death and witnessing
death was a constant occurrence in the FARC. He personally was always fearful he could be killed or
betrayed receiving a harsh punishment. “One could not have friends in the FARC because everyone was
the enemy,” and he feared an acquaintance may turn him in for some small infraction. 55 He recounted
how he was tied to a tree for forty days for dropping a 3 kg bag of sugar on the ground (member was a
FARC cook). Uberney routinely saw FARC members murdered by the group for small infractions. He
stressed that “fear permeated the group” in his interview. 56 It appears through these interviews that FARC

48
Gutierrez, Gustavo, A Theology of Liberation: 15th Anniversary Edition. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
1988), xxv.
49
Notre Dame University website, People: Gustavo Gutierrez, O.P. (2012), available at:
http://theology.nd.edu/people/faculty/gustavo-gutierrez-o-p/.
50
Brittain, James, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia (New York, NY: Pluto Press, 2010), 275.
51
Ibid.
52
Sanchez-Lopera, Alejandro, GENEALOGÍAS DE LA COLOMBIANIDAD: Formaciones discursivas y
tecnologías de gobierno en los siglos XIX y XX, Capitulo IV, Camilo Torres Restrepo: la posibilidad de
una moral insurgente (Bogota, Colombia: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2008, translated by the
author), 135.
53
United Press International, “Kill priests,” September 6, 2005.
54
Martin, The Kingdom of the Cults, 25.
55
Interview with the author, Bogota, Colombia, July 10, 2012.
56
Ibid.
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members believed leaders felt fear was strength. It was a tool to unite the members of the group, make
them more flexible to change and in-turn better able to rebuff the Colombian security forces’ activities.
External threats were obvious ones like the Colombian Army, Police or other Security Forces who would
“shoot on sight” as the members were led to believe. However, other less obvious threats also were feared
such as the previously mentioned clergy, as well as every-day citizens in cities and large towns. These
citizens were feared because the group believed their loyalty was to Colombian security forces. “Thomas”
mentioned he went to bed fearing death and awoke fearing death. It is interesting that Thomas’ statement
“returning to the FARC is worse than death or a Colombian prison” supports Dr. Singer’s observation
about persons leaving cults. 57 She mentions these persons are denounced and vilified, “entered on a
roster of enemies and non-people… Horrendous lies are told about them… The pariah image takes on
enormous proportions and … it seems a fate worse than death.” 58
The FARC is able to implement fear as an element of mind-control due to its members’ worldly
inexperience. They continued warnings that Colombian State Forces would “shoot any FARC member onsight” made all the interviewed members believe they were in an “us versus them” situation whenever the
two would encounter one another. 59 This is easy for members to believe since Colombian military forces
are rarely seen in FARC controlled areas. Therefore their lack of experience with government forces
makes it easy to trust what they are told. In fact, during his interview, William noted 80 percent of the
FARC is still recruited from rural areas where the state cannot patrol due to the rugged terrain. 60
Therefore, since FARC members never speak to or see a state presence, it is easy to believe the rhetoric
that Colombian Police or Army are evil entities bent on killing the freedom fighters.
The concept of fear of the state and its elements was a continual theme in all of the interviews. As José
Luis, a former deputy commander of a front (the FARC equivalent of a Colombian Army Battalion) of 300
men found, his position of authority did not make him immune to the same treatment. He was sentenced
to death for an infraction and escaped from FARC-controlled territory while being pursued by the very
men and women he previously led as they shot at him. “By the grace of God I was not shot badly as I
escaped,” he stated. 61 As he made his way from the FARC territory, he encountered a small group of army
soldiers in small town bordering the territory. After he surrendered to the soldiers, he was surprised they
only placed handcuffs on him and took him to a military base. Although the Base Commander was not
present when José Luis arrived at the base, a Captain greeted him with a cell phone to speak with the Base
Commander. To José Luis’ surprise, he was congratulated on his escape and welcomed to freedom. José
Luis became emotional when he recounted the Colonel’s words to him “welcome home my brother, the
nightmare is over.” 62
Sadly, the FARC’s use of fear starts early. José Luis stated he would run parcels to different houses in his
village, and in-turn was paid by the FARC in candy as an eight year old. By the time he was nine he had
been recruited. His recruitment is a violation of international humanitarian law that “prohibits
combatants from recruiting children under the age of fifteen or allowing them to take part in
hostilities.” 63 José Luis was lured into the group with candy. As he explained “I knew who they were and
they asked me to run errands for them; it made me feel important.” 64 Therefore, by the time he was nine,
he asked how he could become a part of the group and was initiated. The lessons of fear began early. As
soon as he was inducted into the FARC, he learned to become cold and calculating. These lessons were
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stressful and the need to alleviate that stress could lead to breaking cardinal rules: “Alcohol use is not
tolerated and can get one killed because it can take the edge off of your fear…” 65
The fear manifests itself in many different ways. Since the FARC turns young children into fighters and
makes them carry out the same duties as the adult members, they must toe the mark or become examples
to others. 66 If a child deserts the FARC it can earn them a death sentence; sometimes carried out by other
children. 67
The FARC also uses fear of the government to demonstrate to the member that they are freed from
exploitation by the state and state forces. William noted an example of state blunders that strengthen and
solidify the idea the state exploits persons in these remote areas. Recounting a story he was told by a local
peasant in his hometown, not affiliated with the FARC (in-fact someone who does not like the FARC
according to William), the man was interviewed by army forces traversing through his region. He was
questioned about what he knew of FARC positions, safe locations and other valuable intelligence. The
man knew little of the group, only that they had been nearby, but “since the FARC moves camps every 1520 days” the man did not know where they went. The army soldier then became agitated. He told the
farmer he did not believe him, and that the army believed the man was covering for the FARC. He then
said he was going to take the man’s three chickens because he thought the chickens were going to be used
as food for the FARC. To a FARC member, the army’s stealing of the man’s chickens was a direct
correlation to extreme exploitation, since these chickens were in reality their sole source of meat.
The FARC champions the idea that the state is exploiting the populace. This furthers another of their
concepts, that the FARC must remain isolated. This is for several reasons. Primarily, it is for security.
Since the state is in an open war with the group, isolation is the only means available to ensure stability
and security for the group’s separate units. This isolation means never contacting family members again.
In fact, as Uberney noted some times the only way parents know their sons or daughters have become a
part of the guerilla forces is by announcements from the state on television (if they are fortunate enough
to have access to a television), or through announcements made in the newspapers or on the radio.
As Dr. Singer noted, cults often direct the timeframe for sleeping, bathing, and eating. 68 This methodical
scheduling is also something the FARC performs. William noted there was a FARC schedule that was
followed every day. There were no deviations from the schedule, and every day the group would arise at
4:00am and begin their day. A set schedule ensured if anyone deviated from the mission the anomaly
would immediately be seen.
All these factors, mind-control, forced murder of members, lack of individuality, a culture of fear, the
rigorous daily schedule, etc., demonstrate the cult of the FARC. They are indeed a cult, a societal cancer
that is destroying the nation and causing instability in Colombia. However, the cultish examples here, and
the Colombian Government’s lack of acknowledgement of a Cult of the FARC may shed light on why the
Colombian government’s prosecution of this war has stymied for so long. A major part of the problem for
the government is that it believes it is fighting only an insurgency. They have to understand that cults are
fought differently than pure insurgencies.
Nevertheless, there are some in academia who believe that the FARC’s action defines them not only as a
secular cult, but also as a totalist group. However, the current available data on the group does not
support this hypothesis. As noted by recognized cult expert Dr. Michael Langone “while there is overlap
between the two definitions, it is possible to be a totalist group and not a cult and vice versa.” 69 To
examine the hypothesis, one must observe the traits examined by the man who first coined the term, Dr.
Robert Jay Lifton, M.D. Dr. Lifton identified several traits specific to totalist groups:
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“Milieu Control” or “the control of all communication within a given environment.” 70 This
creates isolation from a greater society.
“Mystical manipulation or planned spontaneity” which is the manipulation of events so as to
appear spontaneous or possible through the group’s special powers or insight.
“A demand for purity and a cult of confession.” 71 In these groups “purification is a continuing
process, often institutionalized in the cult of confession, which enforces conformity through
guilt and shame evoked by mutual criticism and self-criticism in small groups.” 72
"Sacred science" is used to rationalize specific traits of the cult typically including “a claim to
special scientific knowledge of human behavior and psychology.” 73
"Loading of the language" Stated another way, “A simplified, cliché-ridden language can exert
enormous psychological force, reducing every issue in a complicated life to a single set of
slogans that are said to embody the truth as a totality.” 74
“The principle of doctrine over person” or “Those who have not seen the light and embraced
the truth are wedded to evil, tainted, and therefore in some sense, usually metaphorical, lack
the right to exist.” 75

While the FARC does limit the communication of its’ members with outsiders, and the group’s use of
slogans and songs is well known, there is currently no evidence to suggest they engage in mystical
manipulation, demand for purity, the concept of sacred science, or the principle of doctrine over the
person. In fact, since the FARC allegedly aims to equalize all citizens’ social status, all citizens have the
same ability to fight for the cause and thus are not lost, as they have not been exposed to the truth. While
it is possible the group in the future can morph into a totalist group, as of yet the FARC does not fit the
criteria.

Concluding Thoughts
Much like U.S. operations in Vietnam, Colombia for the most part has won many battles against the FARC
but it has not yet won the war. This may be due to the fact that Colombia is pursuing a largely military
campaign against this foe, vice a psychological one. While the Colombian military does engage in
psychological operations, they are largely to aid the military effort. Therefore, a major psychological effort
separate but in conjunction with the military effort is required to fully coax the FARC into submission.
The focus of these operations should be on the FARC weaknesses. Although not usually expressed, there
are cracks in the FARC operations that the Colombian Government can fully exploit. These include the
inconsistency between leadership and the rank and file, and the personal feelings of the persons in the
group. Exploiting these cracks as part of a greater psychological campaign against the FARC’s modus
operandi can substantially weaken this foe and force them into submission. These psychological
operations should include both a method to influence FARC members to desert, a vehicle to help them
transition to civilian life, and a way to highlight to remaining members that deserters have earned
substantial gains by leaving the group vice losing their life as FARC leaders have wrongly stated. How
these actions are accomplished will be the decisions of the Colombian military.
Furthermore, all of those interviewed indicated they did not know or see the state or elements of its
authority, highlighting a major problem…a power vacuum. These former members never witnessed any
state presence…“not a policeman, not a soldier,…no one.” 76 The FARC simply appeared and took control.
In fact, Uberney stated in these areas “the FARC were both the heroes and the villains…they were feared
because they were known killers, and forced the farmers to grow coca for them, but respected and
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admired because they were the authority.” 77 William echoed this idea stating that the FARC “performed
all matters of public service, from stopping violence between domestic partners to resolving disputes
between neighbors...they were the law.” 78
Therefore, the state needs to appear in these areas for the populace to understand that the state is
something to be respected, not something to be feared. The FARC have waged an information operations
campaign in areas they control. Their propaganda states the Government of Colombia is repressive, does
not care about the peasants, and is corrupt. These efforts have, at best, cast doubt in the mind of the
peasants in these areas, and at worse have turned the minds of these people against the state. However,
small efforts to provide these severely impoverished peasants with aid will go a long way to dispel these
FARC untruths. Small gestures such as providing gravel to build makeshift roads, or corrugated tin to
build roofs will show the state as an entity that cares about its citizenry. However, to accomplish these
efforts, the government needs to project presence. Simply constructing a police outpost is not enough. The
state needs to help those in need and indeed exert its authority. Creating law and order, but also
championing the people to the state and taking steps to enrich their lives will rob the FARC of its
powerbase. In short, the state needs to give strength to those who are intimidated by the FARC.
The members of the Colombian Government to power-project or ‘colonize’ these areas need to be useful
and resourceful. They need to become specialists in these areas, and should be trained on how to help the
locals. Any Colombian representative sent in this area is an ambassador with a huge responsibility.
In the end, the Colombian Government has made huge strides stabilizing the nation since 1998, the time
the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency warned of Colombia’s possible failure as a state. Colombian
Government activities have shown not only the incredible resiliency of a nation and a people who have
suffered much, but also the strength to persevere through the time of the cartels. While the cartels are all
but gone, the FARC remains a destabilizing force not only for Colombia, but also for the other Andean
nations that border Colombia. However, strong partnerships such as the U.S.-Colombia Trade agreement
signed in 2012 will continue to help this beacon of democracy persevere.
Ultimately, Colombia’s triumph over the FARC is not only a victory for democracy, but a victory for
decency and the international community in the worldwide law enforcement effort combatting illegal
drugs. Since Colombia’s cocaine trafficking is almost exclusively run by the FARC, their eradication will
change the dynamics of worldwide cocaine movement and distribution. The impact of the eradication of
both the FARC and by association, its’ worldwide distribution network, will have lasting reverberations
throughout the world. While there will likely be another nation or group of bandits who take up the
cocaine vacuum after the FARC is eradicated, the group’s demise will have a positive, lasting impact on
worldwide law enforcement and contribute to security far beyond Colombia’s borders.
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